When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction Under Free Access Correct? -- A Game - Theoretic Justification for Non Game-Theoretic Analyses
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|Date of creation:||1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-173, February.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1987. "Dynamic Animal Economics," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(3), pages 547-557.
- Mukesh Eswaran & Tracy Lewis, 1985. "Exhaustible Resources and Alternative Equilibrium Concepts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 459-473, August.
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