When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses
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- Mukesh Eswaran & Tracy Lewis, 1985. "Exhaustible Resources and Alternative Equilibrium Concepts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 459-473, August.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-173, February.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1987. "Dynamic Animal Economics," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(3), pages 547-557.