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When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses

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  • Robin Brooks
  • Michael Murray
  • Stephen Salant
  • Jill C. Weise

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  • Robin Brooks & Michael Murray & Stephen Salant & Jill C. Weise, 1999. "When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 843-858, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:107:y:1999:i:4:p:843-858
    DOI: 10.1086/250081
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mukesh Eswaran & Tracy Lewis, 1985. "Exhaustible Resources and Alternative Equilibrium Concepts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 459-473, August.
    2. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-173, February.
    3. Sherwin Rosen, 1987. "Dynamic Animal Economics," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(3), pages 547-557.
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis Hotte, 2005. "Natural-resource exploitation with costly enforcement of property rights," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 497-521, July.
    2. Holland, Stephen P. & Moore, Michael R., 2003. "Cadillac Desert revisited: property rights, public policy, and water-resource depletion," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-155, July.
    3. Colin Rowat & Jayasri Dutta, 2007. "The Commons with Capital Markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(2), pages 225-254, May.
    4. Colin Rowat & Jayasri Dutta, 2004. "The road to extinction: commons with capital markets," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 145, Econometric Society.
    5. Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013. "On the dual nature of weak property rights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
    6. López-Feldman, Alejandro & Edward Taylor, J., 2009. "Labor allocation to non-timber extraction in a Mexican rainforest community," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 205-221, August.
    7. Holland, Stephen P. & Moore, Michael R., 2000. "Cadillac Desert Revisited: Property Rights, Public Policy, And Water-Resource Depletion In The American West," 2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL 21861, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Brozovic, Nicholas & Sunding, David L. & Zilberman, David, 2004. "Measuring The Gains From Management Of Spatially Heterogeneous Resources: The Case Of Groundwater," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20240, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    9. Manning, Dale T. & Taylor, J. Edward, 2015. "Agricultural Efficiency and Labor Supply to Common Property Resource Collection: Lessons from Rural Mexico," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 40(3), pages 1-22, September.
    10. Lopez-Feldman, Alejandro & Taylor, J. Edward, 2006. "Labor Allocation to Non-Timber Forest Products Extraction: The Case of Lacandona Rainforest Community," Working Papers 190915, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    11. Ronan Congar & Louis Hotte, 2021. "Open Access Versus Restricted Access in a General Equilibrium with Mobile Capital," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(3), pages 521-544, March.
    12. Madani, Kaveh & Dinar, Ariel, 2012. "Non-cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 34-45.
    13. Dale T. Manning & J. Edward Taylor & James E. Wilen, 2018. "General Equilibrium Tragedy of the Commons," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(1), pages 75-101, January.

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