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Pierre Fleckinger

Personal Details

First Name:Pierre
Middle Name:
Last Name:Fleckinger
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfl46
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

(50%) Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Paris, France
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/

: + 33 44 07 81 00
+ 33 1 44 07 83 01
106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital 75 647 PARIS CEDEX 13
RePEc:edi:cenp1fr (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Paris School of Economics

Paris, France
http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/

: 33.1.80.52.16.60

48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 Paris
RePEc:edi:eeparfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay & Constance Monnier, 2013. "Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00977587, HAL.
  2. Pierre Fleckinger, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00670892, HAL.
  3. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant, 2011. "Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement When Firms Self-Regulate," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00529632, HAL.
  4. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville, 2010. "Voluntary Approaches in the Policy Cycle," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00818339, HAL.
  5. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant, 2009. "La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00447028, HAL.
  6. Pierre Fleckinger, 2008. "Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00641865, HAL.
  7. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "Collective Reputation and Market Structure: Regulating the Quality vs Quantity Trade-of," Working Papers hal-00243080, HAL.
  8. Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay, 2006. "Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00641861, HAL.
  9. Ignace Adant & Pierre Fleckinger, 2005. "Controling externalities with asymmetric information : Ferrous Scrap Recycling and the Gold Rush Problem," Working Papers hal-00243017, HAL.

Articles

  1. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville, 2017. "Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 242-274, February.
  2. Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay & Constance Monnier, 2013. "Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 64(3), pages 457-467.
  3. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 93-117.
  4. Fleckinger, Pierre & Glachant, Matthieu, 2010. "The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 57-66, January.
  5. Fleckinger, Pierre & Lafay, Thierry, 2010. "Product flexibility and price competition in Hotelling's duopoly," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 61-68, July.
  6. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant, 2009. "La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 95-105.
  7. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2008. "Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-13, January.
  8. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2007. "Informed principal and countervailing incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 240-244, February.
  9. Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay, 2006. "Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 573-581.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Pierre Fleckinger, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00670892, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Joyee Deb & Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee, 2015. "Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1995, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Kellner, Christian, 2015. "Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 627-655.
    3. Daske, Thomas, 2016. "Pooling hawks and doves: Interim-efficient labor contracts for other-regarding agents," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145951, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Tong Wang & Seong Cheol Park, 2014. "Livestock Disease Indemnity Design under Common Uncertainty: A Multi-agent Problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1396-1409.
    5. Kirchmaier, Isadora, 2014. "Service Organizations: Customer Contact and Incentives of Knowledge Managers," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100418, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.

  2. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant, 2011. "Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement When Firms Self-Regulate," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00529632, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Kathleen Segerson, 2013. "Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection and Resource Management," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 161-180, June.
    2. Buckley, Ralf, 2013. "Social-benefit certification as a game," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 203-209.

  3. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant, 2009. "La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00447028, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Ambec & Paul Lanoie, 2009. "Performance environnementale et économique de l’entreprise," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 190(4), pages 71-94.

  4. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "Collective Reputation and Market Structure: Regulating the Quality vs Quantity Trade-of," Working Papers hal-00243080, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniela Benavente, 2010. "Geographical Indications: The Economics of Claw-Back," IHEID Working Papers 11-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    2. Stefano Castriota & Marco Delmastro, 2010. "Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 149-172.
    3. Benavente, Daniela, 2010. "Geographical Indications: The Economics of Claw-Back," Miscellaneous Papers 119117, Agecon Search.
    4. McQuade, Timothy & Salant, Stephen W. & Winfree, Jason, 2010. "Markets with Untraceable Goods of Unknown Quality: A Market Failure Exacerbated by Globalization," Discussion Papers dp-09-31, Resources For the Future.
    5. Benavente, Daniela, 2010. "The Economics of Geographical Indications: GIs modeled as club assets," Miscellaneous Papers 119116, Agecon Search.
    6. Baniak Andrzej & Grajzl Peter, 2013. "Equilibrium and Welfare in a Model of Torts with Industry Reputation Effects," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 265-302, October.
    7. Daniela Benavente, 2010. "The Economics of Geographical Indications: GIs Modelled As Club Assets," IHEID Working Papers 10-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    8. Adalja, Aaron & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2016. "Foodborne Illness Outbreaks, Collective Reputation, and Voluntary Adoption of Industry-wide Food Safety Protocols by Fruit and Vegetable Growers," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts 235865, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    9. Bailet, Isabelle & Diotallevi, Francesco & Marchini, Andrea, 2010. "Determinant factors in reputation of wines:analysis of wine production in Central Italy," MPRA Paper 40635, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville, 2017. "Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 242-274, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Deb, Joyee, 2016. "Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting," CEPR Discussion Papers 11513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Fleckinger, Pierre & Mimra, Wanda & Zago, Angelo, 2017. "The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168283, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville, 2012. "The informational role of nongovernmental organizations to induce self-regulation: Cheering the leaders or booing the laggards?," Working Papers hal-00716864, HAL.

  2. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 93-117. See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Fleckinger, Pierre & Glachant, Matthieu, 2010. "The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 57-66, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Norimichi Matsueda & Yoko Nagase, 2011. "An Economic Analysis of the Packaging Waste Recovery Note System in the UK," Discussion Paper Series 72, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jun 2011.
    2. M. Dubois & J. Eyckmans, 2015. "Efficient Waste Management Policies and Strategic Behavior with Open Borders," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 907-923, December.
    3. Houévoh Amandine R. Gnonlonfin, 2016. "An evaluation of French municipal solid waste pricing system," Policy Papers 2016.05, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    4. Valentina Iafolla & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Francesco Nicolli, 2010. "Rifiuti generati, rifiuti in discarica ed efficacia delle politiche ambientali in Europa," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 0(2), pages 103-135.
    5. Acuff, Kaylee & Kaffine, Daniel T., 2013. "Greenhouse gas emissions, waste and recycling policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 74-86.
    6. Faten Loukil & Lamia Rouached, 2014. "Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility: Comparative Analysis of Packaging Waste Management," Working Papers 879, Economic Research Forum, revised Nov 2014.
    7. Bhaskar, K. & Turaga, Rama Mohana, 2015. "Extended Producer Responsibility as an Instrument for Electronic Waste Management: A Critical Analysis of India’s e-waste Rules," IIMA Working Papers WP2015-01-04, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
    8. Bernard, Sophie, 2015. "North–south trade in reusable goods: Green design meets illegal shipments of waste," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 22-35.
    9. Brice ARNAUD, 2014. "Extended Producer Responsibility and Green Marketing: an Application to Packaging," Cahiers du GREThA 2014-04, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
    10. Valentina Iafolla & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Francesco Nicolli, 2010. "Are You SURE You Want to Waste Policy Chances? Waste Generation, Landfill Diversion and Environmental Policy Effectiveness in the EU15," Working Papers 2010.77, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Brice Arnaud, 2017. "Extended Producer Responsibility and Green Marketing: An Application to Packaging," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 285-296, June.

  4. Fleckinger, Pierre & Lafay, Thierry, 2010. "Product flexibility and price competition in Hotelling's duopoly," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 61-68, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Javier Elizalde & Markus Kinateder & Ignacio Rodríguez-Carreño, 2015. "Entry regulation, firm’s behaviour and social welfare," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 13-31, August.
    2. Kress, Dominik & Pesch, Erwin, 2012. "Sequential competitive location on networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 217(3), pages 483-499.
    3. Javier Elizalde & Markus Kinateder & Ignacio Rodríguez-Carreño, 2014. "Entry Regulation in a Linear Market with Elastic Demand," Faculty Working Papers 02/14, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    4. Guo, Wen-Chung & Lai, Fu-Chuan & Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2015. "A Hotelling model with production," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 40-49.

  5. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant, 2009. "La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 95-105.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2007. "Informed principal and countervailing incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 240-244, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    3. Cho, Wonjoo & Blandford, David, 2015. "Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway," 89th Annual Conference, April 13-15, 2015, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 204212, Agricultural Economics Society.

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