Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling
We study a duopoly on a market with horizontal differentiation where firms compete in catalog : firms choose a price and a location in the consumer’ space. Whereas there is no equilibrium in pure strategy for the simultaneous game, we show that an equilibrium always exists in a sequential competition. In this subgame perfect equilibrium the leader chooses a more specific product at a lower price than the follower. Thus the leader earns finally less than the follower. This introduces a tension between the temptation of attrition, which leads to an unstable configuration, and the will to guarantee a stricly positive profit. Classification JEL : L11, H41, D43, M3.
References listed on IDEAS
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650, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MacLeod, W. Bentley, 1985. "On the non-existence of equilibria in differentiated product models," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 245-262, June.
- Hinloopen, Jeroen & van Marrewijk, Charles, 1999. "On the limits and possibilities of the principle of minimum differentiation1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 735-750, July.
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