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The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation

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  • Fleckinger, Pierre
  • Mimra, Wanda
  • Zago, Angelo

Abstract

We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.

Suggested Citation

  • Fleckinger, Pierre & Mimra, Wanda & Zago, Angelo, 2017. "The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168283, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiaonan Zhang & Honglei Li, 2023. "Reputation incentive model of open innovation of scientific and technological-based SMEs considering fairness preference," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-11, December.
    2. Jason A. Winfree, 2023. "Collective reputation and food," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(2), pages 666-683, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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