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Reputation incentive model of open innovation of scientific and technological-based SMEs considering fairness preference

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  • Xiaonan Zhang

    (Liaoning Normal University)

  • Honglei Li

    (Liaoning Normal University)

Abstract

The participation of external scientific research teams is an important support for the success of open innovation of scientific and technological-based small and medium enterprise (SMEs). The incentive mechanism should not only focus on traditional influencing factors but also on the scientific research innovation team’s internal characteristics and external environment. Considering the fairness preference of scientific research innovation teams, this paper constructs an open innovation reputation incentive model for scientific and technological-based SMEs and discusses the impact of relevant factors on the reputation and effort level of scientific research innovation teams under the situation of complete information and incomplete information. The results show that: (1) under the condition of complete information, the fairness preference of scientific research innovation teams is positively related to reputation incentive other than the effort level; (2) under the condition of incomplete information, the fairness preference of scientific research innovation teams has no significant impact on the reputation incentive but is negatively related to the effort level; (3) whether considering the fairness preference or not, the effort level and innovation capability of the scientific research innovation teams are positively correlated with the reputation incentive, while the effort cost, risk aversion coefficient, income distribution coefficient, and variance of external environment variable are negatively correlated with the reputation incentive; (4) the innovation ability of scientific research innovation teams is positively related to the effort level, while the effort cost, risk aversion coefficient, and variance of external environment variable are negatively related to the effort level.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaonan Zhang & Honglei Li, 2023. "Reputation incentive model of open innovation of scientific and technological-based SMEs considering fairness preference," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-11, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palcom:v:10:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-023-02489-x
    DOI: 10.1057/s41599-023-02489-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Qingwen Bo & Mengxiao Cao & Yan Wang & Yuhuan Xia & Wei Liu, 2024. "Organizational slack, ambidextrous search and high-tech SMEs’ performance: do strategic orientations matter?," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-11, December.

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