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Lutte contre les cartels : comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ?

Author

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  • Béatrice Boulu-Reshef
  • Constance Monnier-Schlumberger

Abstract

This article proposes an experimental approach that makes it possible to identify the individuals who are most likely to form a cartel: the ?hotheads.? The experiments test the deterrent effectiveness of antitrust schemes by comparing the propensity to agree to cartel in different sanctions frameworks?fine, leniency, compliance and exclusion?and detection?detection with exogenous probability or by denunciation. Compliance and exclusion are particularly dissuasive, leniency is not. The deterrent effect of high fines is limited for ?hotheads,? who are more influenced by the magnitude of the detection risk. Gender differences and risk aversion impact behaviors of the other participants but not of the participants described as ?hotheads.? Classification JEL : K21, K42, L41.

Suggested Citation

  • Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Constance Monnier-Schlumberger, 2019. "Lutte contre les cartels : comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 1187-1199.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_706_1187
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    Cited by:

    1. Carmen García & Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2024. "Cartels, board gender composition and gender quotas," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 283-320, October.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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