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Lutte contre les cartels : Comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ?

Author

Listed:
  • Béatrice Boulu-Reshef

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Constance Monnier-Schlumberger

    (PRISM Sorbonne - Pôle de recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences du management - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

Cet article propose une approche expérimentale qui rend possible l'identification des individus les plus susceptibles de former un cartel : les « têtes brûlées ». Les expériences testent l'efficacité dissuasive des différents dispositifs de lutte contre les cartels en comparant les propensions à s'entendre des individus dans différents types de dispositifs de sanctions-amende, clémence, conformité, et exclusion-et de détection-détection avec probabilité exogène ou par dénonciation dans le cas de la clémence. La conformité et l'exclusion s'avèrent particulièrement dissuasive, la clémence ne l'est pas. L'effet dissuasif des amendes élevées est limité pour les « têtes brûlées », qui sont davantage influencés par l'ampleur du risque de détection. Les différences de genre et d'aversion pour le risque impactent le comportement chez les autres participants mais pas chez les individus qualifiés de « têtes brûlées ».

Suggested Citation

  • Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Constance Monnier-Schlumberger, 2019. "Lutte contre les cartels : Comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02123622, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-02123622
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02123622
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Expérience; cartel; sanctions; têtes brûlées;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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