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De nouveaux éclairages sur le théorème de Coase et la vacuité du coeur

Author

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  • Stéphane Gonzalez

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon)

  • Alain Marciano

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement)

Abstract

This paper is a contribution to the literature which uses the theory of cooperative game in order to show the non validity of the Coase Theorem in a 3-player game. We examine new situations which give rise to the refinement of the conditions under which the core of a game with three players is (non)empty and put forward three main results. First, we demonstrate that the nonemptiness of the core depends on the liability rules and the allocation of rights. Second, we show that when the externality is non transferable, the core is nonempty if the polluter is not liable but also that the core is always nonempty when the negotiations over a pollution level require unanimity. We provide a counterexample of the nonemptiness of the core in all other situations. Third, we show that, if the externality is non transferable, then an agent who does not negotiate can nevertheless influence the outcome of the negociation.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Gonzalez & Alain Marciano, 2017. "De nouveaux éclairages sur le théorème de Coase et la vacuité du coeur," Working Papers halshs-01544892, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01544892
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01544892
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coase theorem; externality; negociation; cooperative game; core; Théorème de Coase; externalités; jeux coopératifs; coeur;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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