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Monetary policy decision making: the role of ideology, institutions and central bank independence

Author

Listed:
  • Cleomar Gomes da silva

    (Institute of Economics, Federal University of Uberlandia and CNPq Associate Researcher, Brazil)

  • Flavio V. Vieira

    (Institute of Economics, Federal University of Uberlandia and CNPq Associate Researcher, Brazil)

Abstract

The aim of this article is to evaluate whether variables related to partisan ideology, institutions and central bank independence play a role in monetary policy decision making. The annual panel data set includes 53 countries (advanced and emerging/developing economies) for the period 2001-2012. The estimation of several Taylor Rules, via system GMM dynamic panel data models, shows that the conduct of monetary policy seems not to be influenced by the factors mentioned above. The same result applies for the period after the global financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Cleomar Gomes da silva & Flavio V. Vieira, 2016. "Monetary policy decision making: the role of ideology, institutions and central bank independence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(4), pages 2051-2062.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00120
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy; Central Bank Independence; Ideology; Panel Data Analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • C5 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling

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