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Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information

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  • Schmidt-Mohr, Udo

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  • Schmidt-Mohr, Udo, 1997. "Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 1321-1342, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:41:y:1997:i:7:p:1321-1342
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    1. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    4. Bester, Helmut, 1987. "The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 887-899, June.
    5. Mattesini, Fabrizio, 1990. "Screening in the credit market : The role of collateral," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-22, August.
    6. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    7. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    8. Jaffee, Dwight & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1990. "Credit rationing," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 837-888, Elsevier.
    9. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    10. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    11. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    12. Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, 1988. "Signaling in Credit Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 101-129.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raff, Horst & Ryan, Michael & Stähler, Frank, 2018. "Financial frictions and foreign direct investment: Evidence from Japanese microdata," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 109-122.
    2. Kaiser, Ulrich, 2001. "Moving in and out of financial distress: evidence for newly founded service sector firms," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-09, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Raff, Horst & Ryan, Michael & Stähler, Frank, 2015. "Financial frictions and foreign direct investment: Theory and evidence from Japanese microdata," Kiel Working Papers 1992, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    5. Buckley, Robert & Karaguishiyeva, Gulmira & Van Order, Robert & Vecvagare, Laura, 2003. "Comparing mortgage credit risk policies : an options-based approach," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3047, The World Bank.
    6. Harhoff, Dietmar & Korting, Timm, 1998. "Lending relationships in Germany - Empirical evidence from survey data," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(10-11), pages 1317-1353, October.
    7. Karel Janda, 2006. "Agency Theory Approach to the Contracting between Lender and Borrower [Smluvní vztah mezi věřitelem a dlužníkem z hlediska přístupu teorie zastoupení]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(3), pages 34-47.
    8. Karel Janda, 2008. "Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?," Working Papers IES 2008/12, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2008.
    9. Größl Ingrid & Stahlecker Peter, 2000. "Finanzierungsbedingungen und Güterangebot: Ein Überblick über finanzökonomische Ansätze und deren geldpolitische Konsequenzen," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 220(2), pages 223-250, April.
    10. Herve Alexandre & Karima Bouaiss & Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 2010. "Does a banking relationship help a firm on the syndicated loans market in a time of financial crisis?," Working Papers halshs-00538328, HAL.
    11. Karel Janda, 2004. "Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers IES 61, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
    12. Naoki Kojima, 2009. "Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 175-187, March.
    13. Robert Buckley & Gulmira Karaguishiyeva & Robert Order & Laura Vecvagare, 2006. "Mortgage credit risk in EU countries: Constraints on exploiting the single currency market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 13-27, January.
    14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8559 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Harhoff, Dietmar & Körting, Timm, 1998. "Lending Relationships in Germany: Empirical Results from Survey Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 1917, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Wang, Yu-Lin, 2010. "Does collateral cause inefficient resource allocation?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 220-233, May.
    17. Karel Janda, 2003. "Credit guarantees in a credit market with adverse selection," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2003(4), pages 331-349.
    18. Kraus, Daniel, 2013. "On the existence of credit rationing and screening with loan size in competitive markets with imperfect information," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 131, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    19. Cesaroni, Giovanni, 2010. "Contestability and collateral in credit markets with adverse selection," MPRA Paper 26949, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Hamadi Matoussi & Aida Abdelmoula, 2008. "Using A Neural Network-Based Methodology for Credit–Risk Evaluation of A Tunisian Bank," Working Papers 408, Economic Research Forum, revised 06 Jan 2008.

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