Introduction: Funding Gaps
Theoretical and empirical foundations of government policies to plug alleged business funding gaps are highly controversial but rarely subject to wide-ranging in-depth debate. This symposium from major scholars in the field provides a counterbalance. Topics addressed cover the theory of lending under asymmetric information; its implications for over lending; relationship lending as a market solution to information asymmetries; government emulation of private sector decision-making to eliminate underprovision of high tech equity and theoretically-based empirical work testing for funding deficiencies in the high tech sector. Despite the very different and potentially contradictory contributions the result is, surprisingly, a set of mutually agreed policy conclusions. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002
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Volume (Year): 112 (2002)
Issue (Month): 477 (February)
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