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Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments

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  • Mario Tirelli

Abstract

In this article we propose a security-design problem in which risk neutral entrepreneurs make unobservable investment decisions while employing the investment funds of risk-neutral out- side investor/creditor(s). Contracts are restricted to satisfy limited liability and monotonicity of the payment schedule. The model we present extends the classical one proposed by Innes (1990, Journal of Economic Theory 52, 47-67) along two main directions: agents' decisions may be re-stricted by their initial capital and outside financial opportunities; and their investment decisions may also consist in hiding funds in an asset placed outside their _rms. We motivate our interest in this security-design problem referring to the `opacity' that often characterizes financial decisions of small firms, a particularly large fraction of the non-financial sector in most developed countries

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Tirelli, 2017. "Optimal Financial Contracts With Unobservable Investments," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0230, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0230
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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