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No Bank, One Bank, Several Banks: Does It Matter for Investment?

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Listed:
  • Sonia Ruano

    (Bank of Spain)

  • Robert M. Townsend

    (MIT)

  • Jesus Saurina

    (Bank of Spain)

  • Alexander Karaivanov

    (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

This paper examines whether financial constraints affect firms’ investment decisions for older (larger) firms. We compare a group of unbanked firms to firms that rely on formal financing. Specifically, we combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry (CIR) to classify firms according to their number of banking relations: one, several, or none. Our empirical strategy combines two approaches based on a common theoretical model. First, using a standard Euler equation adjustment cost approach to investment, we find that single-banked firms in our sample are most likely to exhibit cash flow sensitivity while unbanked firms are not. Second, using structural maximum likelihood estimation, we find that unbanked firms have a financial structure which is close to credit subject to moral hazard with unobserved effort, whereas single-banked firms have a financial structure which is more limited, as in an exogenously imposed traditional debt model. Firms in the unbanked category do not rely on bonds, equity, or formal financial markets, but rather on other firms in a financial or family-tied group (with either pyramidal or informal structure). We are among the first to document the importance of such groups in a European country. We control for reverse causality by treating bank relationships as endogenous and/or by appropriate stratifications of the sample.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonia Ruano & Robert M. Townsend & Jesus Saurina & Alexander Karaivanov, 2010. "No Bank, One Bank, Several Banks: Does It Matter for Investment?," 2010 Meeting Papers 669, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:669
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Claessens, Stijn & Ueda, Kenichi & Yafeh, Yishay, 2014. "Institutions and financial frictions: Estimating with structural restrictions on firm value and investment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 107-122.
    2. Steven Ongena & Yuejuan Yu, 2017. "Firm Industry Affiliation and Multiple Bank Relationships," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, pages 1-17.
    3. Yu, Y., 2014. "Essays on relationship banking," Other publications TiSEM f3d56b9e-e79e-46c4-bd42-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Alexander Karaivanov & Robert M. Townsend, 2014. "Dynamic Financial Constraints: Distinguishing Mechanism Design From Exogenously Incomplete Regimes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 887-959, May.
    5. Yishay Yafeh & Kenichi Ueda & Stijn Claessens, 2010. "Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions," IMF Working Papers 10/231, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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