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Performance and Behavior of Family Firms : Evidence from the French Stock Market

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  • David Sraer

    (Crest)

  • David Thesmar

    (Crest)

Abstract

We look at the corporate performance of family firms listed on the Frenchstock exchange between 1994 and 2000. On the French stock market, approximatelyone third of the firms are widely held, another third are founder controlledand the remaining third are heir controlled family firms. We find that family firmslargely outperform widely held corporations. This result holds for founder controlledfirms, but more surprisingly also for heir managed firms. To explain this,we provide evidence consistent with the fact that, because of their different timehorizons, heir managed corporations have a comparative advantage at enforcingimplicit insurance contracts with their labor force. More specifically, we find that:(1) employment in heir managed firms is less sensitive to industry shocks and (2)heirs pay lower wages. Finally, we discuss issues related to the endogeneity of performance/family regressions looking both at delisting and transitions from familyto non-family status. We conclude that these issues may lead us to overestimatethe performance of heirs compared to professionally managed firms, but to underestimatethe performance of heirs when compared to widely held firms.

Suggested Citation

  • David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2004. "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms : Evidence from the French Stock Market," Working Papers 2004-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2004-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    2. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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