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Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan

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  • Joe Peek
  • Eric S. Rosengren

Abstract

This study examines the misallocation of credit in Japan associated with the perverse incentives of banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms. Firms are far more likely to receive additional credit if they are in poor financial condition, and these firms continue to perform poorly after receiving additional bank financing. Troubled Japanese banks allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers primarily to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets. This problem is compounded by extensive corporate affiliations, which provide a further incentive for banks to allocate scarce credit based on considerations other than prudent credit risk analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2003. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," NBER Working Papers 9643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9643
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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