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Bank ties and bond market access: evidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity in Japan

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  • Patrick M. McGuire

Abstract

The banking literature has established that banks can alleviate information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, while the Q literature has used cash flow sensitivity analysis to test whether financing constraints hinder investment. Building on the results in Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Hayashi (2000), this paper investigates whether bank ties in Japan were costly for mature and healthy firms in the 1980s and 1990s and whether banks continued to facilitate investment once non-bank financing options became available. Using the explicit bond issuing criteria to solve the endogenous firm sorting problem, I measure the investment-cash flow sensitivity of Japanese firms, and find it lowest for those firms known to have faced bond market constraints. I then find that the spread in sensitivity was much larger for main bank client firms, once bond market access is controlled for. This result, coupled with results on the relative profitability and bond activity of bank-affiliated firms, is consistent with banks capturing the net benefits of relationship lending during the period of bond market deregulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick M. McGuire, 2004. "Bank ties and bond market access: evidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity in Japan," BIS Working Papers 151, Bank for International Settlements.
  • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:151
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    Cited by:

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    3. Adam Posen, 2003. "It Takes More Than a Bubble to Become Japan," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Anthony Richards & Tim Robinson (ed.),Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    4. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, 2005. "Does Relationship Banking Matter? The Myth of the Japanese Main Bank," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(2), pages 261-302, July.
    5. Laurent Soulat, 2006. "Les modèles Q-investissement et les modèles d'Euler : relations de banque principale, asymétries informationnelles et modifications des structures financières des firmes de keiretsu financier," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00085680, HAL.
    6. Harada, Nobuyuki & Honjo, Yuji, 2005. "Does the Creative Business Promotion Law enhance SMEs' capital investments? Evidence from a panel dataset of unlisted SMEs in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 395-406, December.
    7. von Furstenberg, George M., 2004. "The Contribution of Rapid Financial Development to Asymmetric Growth of Manufacturing Industries: Common Claims vs. Evidence for Poland," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,34, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    8. Mr. Joong S Kang & Shi Piao, 2015. "Production Offshoring and Investment by Japanese Firms," IMF Working Papers 2015/183, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Laurent Soulat, 2006. "Les modèles Q-investment et les modèles d'Euler : relations de banque principale, asymétries informationnelles et modifications des structures financières des firmes de keiretsu financier," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla06010, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    10. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, 2003. "Does Relationship Banking Matter? Japanese Bank-Borrower Ties in Good Times and Bad," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-239, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    11. Agnieszka Slomka-Golebiowska, 2014. "Bankers on boards as corporate governance mechanism: evidence from Poland," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 1019-1040, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Japan; Bank ties and bond market access; investment-cash flow sensitivity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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