Types of bureaucratic interaction
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- Samarth Vaidya, 2009. "Influencing The Public And Efficiency In Bureaucratic Provision," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 259-274, May.
- Geys, Benny & Heinemann, Friedrich & Kalb, Alexander, 2010.
"Voter involvement, fiscal autonomy and public sector efficiency: Evidence from German municipalities,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 265-278, June.
- Geys, Benny & Heinemann, Friedrich & Kalb, Alexander, 2008. "Voter Involvement, Fiscal Autonomy and Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from German Municipalities," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-024, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Geys, Benny & Heinemann, Friedrich & Kalb, Alexander, 2009.
"Voter involvement, fiscal autonomy and public sector efficiency: evidence from German municipalities
[Wähler-Beteiligung, Finanzhoheit und Effizienz des öffentlichen Sektors: Aussagen von deutschen," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-02, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Breton, Albert, 1995. "Organizational hierarchies and bureaucracies: An integrative essay," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 411-440, September.
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- Victor V. Claar, 1998.
"An Incentive-Compatibility Approach To the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau,"
Public Finance Review,
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- Robert M McNab, 2004. "Base Realignment and Closure: Guiding Principles for Peru," Public Economics 0411001, EconWPA.
- Matz Dahlberg & Heléne Lundqvist Nilsson & Eva Mörk, 2008.
"Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power,"
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- Dahlberg, Matz & Lundqvist, Heléne & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power," Working Paper Series 2008:17, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Dahlberg, Matz & Lundqvist, Heléne & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power," Working Paper Series 2008:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Rauscher, Michael, 1997. "Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit Taxation," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 13, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
- Carlsen, Fredrik, 1996. "A note on budget schemes in the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 149-156, April.
- Beate Jochimsen, 2009. "Service Quality in Modern Bureaucracy: Parkinson's Theory at Work," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 44-64, February.
- Revelli Federico & Tovmo Per, 2006. "Declared vs. revealed yardstick competition:Local government efficiency in Norway," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 200605, University of Turin.
- Falch, Torberg, 2001. "Collective bargaining in the public sector and the role of budget determination," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-99, March.
- Silvia Fedeli & Michele Santoni, 2001.
"Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games,"
Economics of Governance,
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- Michele Santoni & Silvia Fedeli, 2000. "Endogenous Institutions in Bureaucratic Compliance Games," Departmental Working Papers 2000-03, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Jan Brueckner & Kevin O'Brien, 1989. "Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 15-41, October.
- Mark Toma, 1989. "Will bounty-hunting revenue agents increase enforcement?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 247-260, June.
- Lars-Erik Borge & Torberg Falch & Per Tovmo, 2008.
"Public sector efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation,"
Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 475-495, September.
- Lars-Erik Borge & Torberg Falch & Per Tovmo, 2007. "Public Sector Efficiency: The Roles of Political and Budgetary Institutions, Fiscal Capacity and Democratic Participation," Working Paper Series 8407, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Rauscher, Michael, 1998. "Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit Taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 59-67, July.
- Basso, Leonardo J. & Zhang, Anming, 2010. "Pricing vs. slot policies when airport profits matter," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 381-391, March.
- Shirley Kress, 1989. "Niskanen effects in the California Community Colleges," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 127-140, May.
- Samarth Vaidya, 2004. "Bureaucratic Provision: Influencing vs. Lying," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 251, Econometric Society.
- Lars-Erik Borge & Jørn Rattsø, 2003. "The Relationships Between Costs and User Charges: The Case of a Norwegian Utility Service," CESifo Working Paper Series 1033, CESifo Group Munich.
- Antonis Adam & Manthos Delis & Pantelis Kammas, 2011.
"Public sector efficiency: leveling the playing field between OECD countries,"
Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 163-183, January.
- Adam, Antonis & Delis, Manthos D & Kammas, Pantelis, 2008. "Public sector efficiency: Leveling the playing field between OECD countries," MPRA Paper 16493, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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