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Base Realignment and Closure: Guiding Principles for Peru

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  • Robert M McNab

    (Naval Postgraduate School)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the prospects for base realignment and closure in Peru and develop an initial strategy for the realignment and closure process. While previous research has focused primarily on the realignment and closure process in developed countries, we instead focus on the need for the realignment and closure process to complement the government’s objectives of democratic governance and economic growth. Given concerns about the reemergence of internal threats, most notably the Shining Path, and significant constraints on public finances, realignment and closure may have to proceed at a significant pace in the near term. We argue that transparency, accountability, and improved civil-military relations should not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert M McNab, 2004. "Base Realignment and Closure: Guiding Principles for Peru," Public Economics 0411001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0411001
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0411/0411001.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Base Realignment and Closure; Peru; Defense Spending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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