Base Realignment and Closure: Guiding Principles for Peru
In this paper, we examine the prospects for base realignment and closure in Peru and develop an initial strategy for the realignment and closure process. While previous research has focused primarily on the realignment and closure process in developed countries, we instead focus on the need for the realignment and closure process to complement the government’s objectives of democratic governance and economic growth. Given concerns about the reemergence of internal threats, most notably the Shining Path, and significant constraints on public finances, realignment and closure may have to proceed at a significant pace in the near term. We argue that transparency, accountability, and improved civil-military relations should not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency.
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