IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Voter involvement, fiscal autonomy and public sector efficiency: Evidence from German municipalities

  • Geys, Benny
  • Heinemann, Friedrich
  • Kalb, Alexander

Social and/or political involvement within the population is often argued to enhance public sector performance. The underlying idea is that engagement fosters political awareness and interest and increases the public's monitoring ability. Still, weak fiscal autonomy can undermine voters' interest in and demand for an efficient production of public services. In our contribution, we test whether and how voter involvement in the political sphere is related to government performance - in terms of its efficiency - using a broad panel of German municipalities. Our results suggest that voter involvement indeed has a positive impact on cost efficiency. Crucially, however, this efficiency-enhancing effect of voter involvement is significantly positively affected by local governments' fiscal autonomy.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-4XNW41F-2/2/44eb47255a37864f343ed264c61d7927
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 265-278

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:2:p:265-278
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  2. Philip Andrew Stevens, 2005. "Assessing the Performance of Local Government," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 193(1), pages 90-101, July.
  3. Aigner, Dennis & Lovell, C. A. Knox & Schmidt, Peter, 1977. "Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production function models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 21-37, July.
  4. De Borger, B, et al, 1994. " Explaining Differences in Productive Efficiency: An Application to Belgian Municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 339-58, September.
  5. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Lars-Erik Borge & Torberg Falch & Per Tovmo, 2008. "Public sector efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 475-495, September.
  7. HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare," CORE Discussion Papers 2005046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Barankay, Iwan & Lockwood, Ben, 2007. "Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1197-1218, June.
  9. Geys, Benny, 2007. "How to make head or tail of bridging and bonding? Adressing the methodological ambiguity
    [Wie ist ‘Briding vs. Bonding’ sozialer Netzwerke zu verstehen? Das Problem der methodischen Zweideutigkeit]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-11, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  10. Moene, Karl O., 1986. "Types of bureaucratic interaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 333-345, April.
  11. Christian, Bjørnskov, 2003. "Corruption and Social Capital," Working Papers 03-13, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
  12. Kappeler, Andreas & Välilä, Timo, 2008. "Fiscal federalism and the composition of public investment in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 562-570, September.
  13. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
  14. Daniel S. Nagin & James B. Rebitzer & Seth Sanders & Lowell J. Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 850-873, September.
  15. Coffé, Hilde & Geys, Benny, 2007. "Measuring the bridging nature of voluntary organizations: a note on the importance of association size
    [Untersuchung des bridging Charakters von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen: Zur Bedeutun
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-04, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  16. Jorid Kalseth & Jørn Rattsø, 1998. "Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 63-83, 03.
  17. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
  18. Greene, William, 2005. "Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of the stochastic frontier model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 269-303, June.
  19. Nigel Pain, 1996. "Modelling Structural Change In The UK Housing Market: A Comparison Of Alternative House Price Models," NIESR Discussion Papers 239, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  20. Bruno Heyndels, 2001. "Asymmetries in the flypaper effect: empirical evidence for the Flemish municipalities," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(10), pages 1329-1334.
  21. Geys, Benny, 2006. "Looking across borders: a test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings
    [Der Blick über die Grenze: Untersuchung von räumlichen Wechselbeziehungen in der Kommunal
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-03, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  22. Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Working papers 368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  23. Battese, G E & Coelli, T J, 1995. "A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a Stochastic Frontier Production Function for Panel Data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 325-32.
  24. Chan, Kenneth S. & Mestelman, Stuart, 1988. "Institutions, efficiency and the strategic behaviour of sponsors and bureaus," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-102, October.
  25. Wagner, Alexander F. & Schneider, Friedrich & Halla, Martin, 2009. "The quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe -- A panel analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 30-41, March.
  26. Christian Bruns & Oliver Himmler, 2011. "Newspaper Circulation and Local Government Efficiency," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113, pages 470-492, 06.
  27. Grossman, Philip J. & Mavros, Panayiotis & Wassmer, Robert W., 1999. "Public Sector Technical Inefficiency in Large U.S. Cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 278-299, September.
  28. Strumpf, Koleman S., 1998. "A predictive index for the flypaper effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 389-412, September.
  29. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  30. Geys, Benny & Moesen, Wim, 2008. "Exploring sources of local government technical inefficiency: evidence from Flemish municipalities
    [Ursachenforschung zur technischen Ineffizienz kommunaler Verwaltungen: Evidenz von flämischen Gem
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-18, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  31. Frey, Bruno S., 1993. "Shirking or work morale? : The impact of regulating," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1523-1532, December.
  32. Bradford, David F & Oates, Wallace E, 1971. "An Analysis of Revenue Sharing in a New Approach to Collective Fiscal Decisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 85(3), pages 416-39, August.
  33. Emili Tortosa Ausina & Diego Prior & María Teresa Balaguer-Coll, 2004. "On The Determinants Of Local Government Performance: A Two-Stage Nonparametric Approach," Working Papers. Serie EC 2004-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  34. Dennis Mueller & Peter Murrell, 1986. "Interest groups and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 125-145, January.
  35. Christensen, Laurits R & Jorgenson, Dale W & Lau, Lawrence J, 1973. "Transcendental Logarithmic Production Frontiers," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 55(1), pages 28-45, February.
  36. Frey, Bruno S, 1993. "Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(4), pages 663-70, October.
  37. DE BORGER, Bruno & KERSTENS, Kristiaan, 1994. "Cost efficiency of Belgian local governments: A comparative analysis of FDH, DEA and econometric approaches," SESO Working Papers 1994002, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  38. Alt, James E. & Lassen, David Dreyer, 2006. "Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1403-1439, August.
  39. Tomoyasu Tanaka, 2006. "Cost Efficiency in Japanese Local Governments: the Economic Effect of Information Technology in Japanese Local Governments," ERSA conference papers ersa06p234, European Regional Science Association.
  40. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
  41. Barkema, Harry G, 1995. "Do Top Managers Work Harder When They Are Monitored?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 19-42.
  42. Geys, Benny & Moesen, Wim, 2008. "Measuring local government technical (in)efficiency: An application and comparison of FDH, DEA and econometric approaches," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-21, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  43. Terrence Casey, 2004. "Social Capital and Regional Economies in Britain," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52, pages 96-117, 03.
  44. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521894753 is not listed on IDEAS
  45. Jean-Luc Migué & Gérard Bélanger & William Niskanen, 1974. "Toward a general theory of managerial discretion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 27-47, March.
  46. Coffé, Hilde & Geys, Benny, 2006. "Towards an empirical characterization of bridging and bonding social capital
    [Zur empirischen Charakterisierung von heterogenen (bridging) und homogenen (bonding) Arten des Sozialkapitals]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-11, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:2:p:265-278. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.