Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment
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|Date of creation:||Nov 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 15/2, 457-478, 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98193-3330|
Web page: http://www.econ.washington.edu/
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