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Der Einfluss der Organisationsstruktur auf die Leistungskontrolle

  • Lindenthal, Sabine
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    Im Rahmen eines dreistufigen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modells wird betrachtet, wie die Organisationsstruktur sowohl die individuellen Kontrollanreize als auch die Kontrollleistung insgesamt beeinflusst. Es zeigt sich, dass unter bestimmten Bedingungen ein Einliniensystem nicht nur hinsichtlich der individuellen Kontrollanreize, sondern auch der Kontrollleistung insgesamt einem Mehrliniensystem überlegen sein kann. Dies mag umso überraschender sein, da letzteres ein differenzierteres Karrieresystems ermöglicht und dort eine Wettbewerbssituation zwischen den Kontrollinstanzen besteht. Zur Bestimmung der bezüglich der Kontrolleffizienz optimalen Organisationsform, wird der mit der verbesserten Kontrolle verbundene Nutzengewinn des Prinzipal den hiermit verbundenen Kosten gegenübergestellt. Der Nutzengewinn ergibt sich aus dem Einfluss der Kontrolle auf das Verhalten des Agenten. Als Ergebnis werden u.a. Bedingungen für die Vorteilhaftigkeit der verschiedenen System formuliert.

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    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51251/1/672183943.pdf
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    Paper provided by Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community (IAAEG), University of Trier in its series Quint-Essenzen with number 62.

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    Date of creation: 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:iaaegq:62
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    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994. "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    2. Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-01, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    3. Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-02, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    4. Fahad Khalil, 1997. "Auditing Without Commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 629-640, Winter.
    5. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
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