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Der Einfluss der Organisationsstruktur auf die Leistungskontrolle


  • Lindenthal, Sabine


Im Rahmen eines dreistufigen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modells wird betrachtet, wie die Organisationsstruktur sowohl die individuellen Kontrollanreize als auch die Kontrollleistung insgesamt beeinflusst. Es zeigt sich, dass unter bestimmten Bedingungen ein Einliniensystem nicht nur hinsichtlich der individuellen Kontrollanreize, sondern auch der Kontrollleistung insgesamt einem Mehrliniensystem überlegen sein kann. Dies mag umso überraschender sein, da letzteres ein differenzierteres Karrieresystems ermöglicht und dort eine Wettbewerbssituation zwischen den Kontrollinstanzen besteht. Zur Bestimmung der bezüglich der Kontrolleffizienz optimalen Organisationsform, wird der mit der verbesserten Kontrolle verbundene Nutzengewinn des Prinzipal den hiermit verbundenen Kosten gegenübergestellt. Der Nutzengewinn ergibt sich aus dem Einfluss der Kontrolle auf das Verhalten des Agenten. Als Ergebnis werden u.a. Bedingungen für die Vorteilhaftigkeit der verschiedenen System formuliert.

Suggested Citation

  • Lindenthal, Sabine, 2000. "Der Einfluss der Organisationsstruktur auf die Leistungskontrolle," Quint-Essenzen 62, University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community (IAAEG).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iaaegq:62

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    1. Fahad Khalil, 1997. "Auditing Without Commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 629-640, Winter.
    2. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
    3. Strausz, Roland, 1997. " Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 497-518, December.
    4. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-656, May.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 232-262.
    6. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
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