Contracting with Third Parties
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.75
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- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2005. "Contracting with Third Parties," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000408, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012.
"Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
- Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013.
"Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
401, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Exit options and the allocation of authority," Discussion Papers 2013/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Comino, Stefano & Nicolò, Antonio & Tedeschi, Piero, 2010.
"Termination clauses in partnerships,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 718-732, July.
- Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2005. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Industrial Organization 0509007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012.
"Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 251, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Evans, R., 2006. "Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0626, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2009. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3923q7kz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Watson, Joel & Wignall, Chris, 2009. "Hold-Up and Durable Trading Opportunities," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt8p8284wg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Chen Cheng, 2021. "Moral hazard in teams with subjective evaluations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 22-48, March.
- Hong, Jieying, 2020. "The financing of alliance entrepreneurship," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 35(1).
- Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
- Jesse Bull, 2012. "Third-Party Budget Breakers and Side Contracting in Team Production," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2606-2614.
- Arya, Anil & Löffler, Clemens & Mittendorf, Brian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2015. "The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(2), pages 393-400.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2006. "The Hold-up Problem," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 142, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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