Third-Party Budget Breakers and Side Contracting in Team Production
In a team production problem with unverifiable effort, budget breaking is essential to implementing efficient levels of effort. This short paper considers the use of a third party, who does not exert effort, in a setting with general contracts that can include message games, as a way to remove resources from the team. I show that if side contracting can influence behavior in a message game in the original contract, the addition of the third party is not helpful. My view of side contracting complements that of Baliga and Sjostrom (2009) in exploring the nature of side contracting that is needed in order for the third party to be useful for budget breaking.
Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002.
"Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6th0060j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2009.
"Contracting with Third Parties,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 75-100, February.
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