Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management
This paper discuss the design of multidimensional yardstick based procurement auction. The suggested design combines Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) based yardstick schemes with the multidimensional score auction. The principal select a single winner to perform a project, characterized by a multidimensional vector. The design is especially useful when there are uncertainty about the underlying common cost structure as well as the principal's valuation function. Potential applications in natural resource management is provided.
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