Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.
Volume (Year): 73 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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