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David McAdams

Personal Details

First Name:David
Middle Name:
Last Name:McAdams
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmc52
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dm121/
Terminal Degree:2001 Department of Economics; Stanford University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/

: 617-253-2659

50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142
RePEc:edi:ssmitus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. David McAdams, 2010. "Discounts For Qualified Buyers Only," Working Papers 10-62, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  2. David McAdams, 2010. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership," Working Papers 10-61, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  3. David McAdams & Yingyao Hu & Matthew Shum, 2010. "Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auctions with Non-Separable Unobserved Heterogeneity," Working Papers 10-63, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  4. Yingyao Hu & David McAdams & Matthew Shum, 2009. "Nonparametric identification of auction models with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity," CeMMAP working papers CWP15/09, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  5. David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2006. "Perverse Incentives in the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit," NBER Working Papers 12008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. McAdams, David & Malone, Thomas W., 2005. "Internal Markets for Supply Chain Capacity Allocation," Working papers 18179, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  7. David McAdams, 2004. "Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 211, Econometric Society.
  8. McAdams, David, 2002. "Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auction," Working papers 4249-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  9. David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray, "undated". "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S," Working Papers 10-64, Duke University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Ali Hortaçsu & David McAdams, 2018. "Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 157-184, March.
  2. Galik, Christopher S. & McAdams, David, 2017. "Supply, Demand, and Uncertainty: Implications for Prelisting Conservation Policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 91-98.
  3. McAdams, David, 2015. "On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 959-972.
  4. Hu, Yingyao & McAdams, David & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 174(2), pages 186-193.
  5. McAdams, David, 2012. "Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 83-85.
  6. Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray, 2011. "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 25-43, Winter.
  7. David McAdams, 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 107-142, November.
  8. Ali Hortaçsu & David McAdams, 2010. "Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 833-865.
  9. McAdams, David, 2008. "Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-85, September.
  10. McAdams, David, 2007. "Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 48-53, April.
  11. David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 260-276, March.
  12. McAdams, David, 2007. "On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 729-732, November.
  13. James T. E. Chapman & David McAdams & Harry J. Paarsch, 2007. "Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under ε-Best Response," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 455-458, May.
  14. McAdams, David, 2007. "Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 144-166, September.
  15. McAdams, David & Schwarz, Michael, 2007. "Who pays when auction rules are bent?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1144-1157, October.
  16. David McAdams, 2007. "Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(3), pages 427-453, February.
  17. David McAdams, 2006. "Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1039-1056.
  18. David McAdams, 2003. "Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1191-1214, July.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  3. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  4. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  5. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2010-10-02 2011-01-03
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2009-07-03 2009-08-22
  3. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2005-07-11
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2011-01-03
  5. NEP-ECM: Econometrics (1) 2009-07-03
  6. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2006-02-26
  7. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (1) 2006-02-26
  8. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2011-01-03

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