Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
Existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium is established in the discriminatory and uniform S + a-th price (a in [0, 1]) auctions of S identical objects when bidders are risk-neutral with independent signals. The model requires discrete price / quantity grids and allows for multi-dimensional signals, interdependent values, increasing marginal values, allocative externalities, and two-sided trading. Given no externalities, further, all mixed-strategy equilibria in these auctions must be ex post allocation- and interim expected payment equivalent to some monotone pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, for standard expected surplus / revenue analysis, there is no loss in restricting attention to monotone strategies
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC