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Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

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  • David McAdams

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  • David McAdams, 2007. "Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(3), pages 427-453, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:427-453
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0038-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 439-454.
    2. Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2003. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(1), pages 115-145.
    3. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sudip Gupta, 2021. "Strategic Overbidding in Dynamic Auctions: Structural Estimation of Value of Synergy," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(2), pages 584-605, February.
    2. Vasilis Syrgkanis & David Kempe & Eva Tardos, 2019. "Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1450-1476, November.
    3. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2019. "On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    5. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2017. "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1399-1429, June.
    6. Virag, Gabor, 2007. "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 156-177, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    First-price auctions; Monotonicity; Asymmetric auctions; D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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