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Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions

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Abstract

A simple example shows that equilibria can fail to exist in second price (Vickrey) and English auctions when there are both common and private components to bidders' valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. The example shows that equilibrium only exists in the extremes of pure private and pure common values, and that existence in standard models is not robust to a slight perturbation.
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  • Matthew Jackson, 2009. "Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 137-145, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:137-145
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0059-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 439-454.
    2. Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-872, July.
    3. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    4. Matthew O. Jackson & Leo K. Simon & Jeroen M. Swinkels & William R. Zame, 2002. "Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1711-1740, September.
    5. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    6. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004. "Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 300, Econometric Society.
    7. Jeroen M. Swinkels & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 499-525, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auction; Equilibrium existence; Nonexistence; Vickrey auction; Second-price auction; English auction; Multi-dimensional information; C62; C63; D44; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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