The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case
Three designs of auctions with quality thresholds are considered. The quality threshold is not known with certainty by the bidders. In one scheme, quality plans submitted by potential bidders are evaluated first and price bids for only those plans that have been approved are invited. The second scheme has price bids first to yield a priority for scrutinizing quality. A third has simultaneous decisions on price and quality. The model yields an equivalence result. The use of reserve prices to produce social optimality is then investigated. The theory is used to discuss the recent auction for U.K. television franchises. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 104 (1994)
Issue (Month): 423 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2 Dean Trench Street, Westminster, SW1P 3HE|
Phone: +44 20 3137 6301
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:104:y:1994:i:423:p:316-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.