The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources
'The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources' by Chris Chan, Patrick Laplagne and David Appels, was released on 20 February 2003. The paper provides an economic framework with which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets in allocating public resources. It links auction outcomes to bidders' behavioural characteristics and to the lack or imbalance of information available to governments and bidders. The analysis covers the key elements of an auction, including the auction form, the auction environment, the bidding behaviour and the implications for allocative efficiency and revenue. The views expressed in this paper are those of the staff involved and do not necessarily reflect those of the Productivity Commission.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 61 3 9653 2100
Fax: 61 3 9653 2199
Web page: http://www.pc.gov.au/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001.
"The Swiss UMTS spectrum auction flop: Bad luck or bad design?,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
2001,50, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 534, CESifo Group Munich.
- Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October.
- Peter Cramton, 1995.
"Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:115:y:2000:i:2:p:341-388 is not listed on IDEAS
- P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998.
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Cripps, Martin & Ireland, Norman, 1994. "The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(423), pages 316-26, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:prodsr:31916. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.