Auctioning wind power sites when environmental quality matters
In this work, we propose an index that allows a public authority to order different projects for the construction of onshore wind energy plants and that explicitly takes into account their environmental quality. Wind farm projects are defined as vectors of four attributes: the technical properties of each project, its social impact, its environmental impact, and the share of earnings that proponents offer to the collectivity in compensation for the negative externalities of the wind plant. We define an absolute index that allows the ordering of different proposals and evaluation of the acceptability of each project, providing the monetary value of each point and inducing a truthful revelation of firms' private information. Moreover, we calibrate the index on the basis of data referring to wind plants in Southern Italy and derive the corresponding iso-scoring curves.
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