Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping
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References listed on IDEAS
- Nicola Doni, 2006. "The Importance Of Reputation In Awarding Public Contracts," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 401-429, December.
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- Brosig, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo, 2011. "Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment," Ruhr Economic Papers 254, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
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- Jeanette Brosig & Timo Heinrich, 2011. "Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment," Ruhr Economic Papers 0254, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
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More about this item
KeywordsRepeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-08-06 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2008-08-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAW-2008-08-06 (Law & Economics)
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