The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources
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- Chan, Chris & Laplagne, Patrick & Appels, David, 2003. "The Role of Auctions in Allocating Public Resources," Staff Research Papers 31916, Productivity Commission.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsAustralia; Research; Ascending-bid auction; Auctions; Bidders; Conservation funds; Descending-bid auction; Dutch auction; English auction; Environmental Management; First-price sealed-bid auction; Infrastructure; Markets; Oral auction; Outcry auction; Pollutant emission permits; Power supply contracts; Public resources; Radio- spectrum; Second-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum licences; Vickrey auction; Water rights;
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-05-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-COM-2003-05-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2003-05-13 (Microeconomics)
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