Dynamics in Non-Binding Procurement Auctions with Boundedly Rational Bidders
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- Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2009. "Dynamics in Non-Binding Procurement Auctions with Boundedly Rational Bidders," Working Papers - Economics wp2009_03.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
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More about this item
KeywordsNon-binding auctions; Product differentiation; Hotelling Duopoly; Expectations; Stability of steady states;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-11-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2009-11-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2009-11-14 (Microeconomics)
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