IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp3137.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Search by Committee

Author

Listed:
  • Albrecht, James

    () (Georgetown University)

  • Anderson, Axel Z.

    () (Georgetown University)

  • Vroman, Susan

    () (Georgetown University)

Abstract

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do single-agent searchers. In addition, mean preserving spreads in the distribution of rewards may lower each member's continuation value – an impossibility in the single-agent setting. If committee members are very patient or very impatient, expected search duration is lower than it would be for a single agent, but, for intermediate levels of patience, this comparison may be reversed. Holding the fraction of votes required to stop fixed, expected search duration rises with committee size on patient committees but falls with committee size on impatient committees. Finally, we consider the effect of varying the number of votes required to stop, holding committee size constant. We show that the welfare-maximizing vote threshold increases in the rate of patience and that there is a finite bound on patience such that unanimity is welfare maximizing.

Suggested Citation

  • Albrecht, James & Anderson, Axel Z. & Vroman, Susan, 2007. "Search by Committee," IZA Discussion Papers 3137, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3137
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp3137.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2005. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(2), pages 445-469, August.
    2. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
    3. J. J. McCall, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-126.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:01:p:23-35_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Vroman, S B, 1985. "No-Help-Wanted Signs and the Duration of Job Search," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(379), pages 767-773, September.
    6. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey: Part I," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(2), pages 155-189, June.
    7. Alexander Shapiro & Jos Berge, 2002. "Statistical inference of minimum rank factor analysis," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 79-94, March.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:01:p:34-45_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    10. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 347-368, September.
    11. Burdett, Kenneth, 1996. "Truncated means and variances," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 263-267, September.
    12. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mauring, Eeva, 2016. "A two-agent model of sequential search and choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 122-137.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2011. "Efficient Search by Committee," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000020, David K. Levine.
    3. Flabbi, Luca & Mabli, James, 2012. "Household Search or Individual Search: Does It Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates," IZA Discussion Papers 6908, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Inukai, Keigo & Kawata, Keisuke & Sasaki, Masaru, 2017. "Committee Search with Ex-ante Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 10760, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. J. Ignacio García-Pérez & Sílvio Rendon, 2016. "Family Job Search and Wealth: The Added Worker Effect Revisited," Working Papers 16.12, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    6. Guler, Bulent & Guvenen, Fatih & Violante, Giovanni L., 2012. "Joint-search theory: New opportunities and new frictions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 352-369.
    7. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "The option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 524-540.
    8. Hizen, Yoichi & Kawata, Keisuke & Sasaki, Masaru, 2013. "An experimental test of a committee search model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 59-76.
    9. Rohan DUTTA, 2016. "Joint Search with No Information: An Inefficient Immediate Agreement Theorem," Cahiers de recherche 12-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    10. Moscarini, Giuseppe & Wright, Randall, 2010. "Introduction to Search Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1319-1324, July.
    11. Ulbricht, Robert, 2016. "Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    12. Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, May.
    13. Shi, Xianwen & Moldovanu, Benny, 2013. "Specialization and partisanship in committee search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    14. Björn Nilsson, 2017. "The School-to-work transition in developing countries," Working Papers DT/2017/07, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    15. Boris Ginzburg & José-Alberto Guerra, 2017. "When Ignorance is Bliss: Theory and Experiment on Collective Learning," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 015377, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    16. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 189-221, April.
    17. Jan Eeckhout, 2012. "Matching Information," 2012 Meeting Papers 835, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Valladares-Esteban, Arnau & Choi, Sekyu, 2016. "The marriage unemployment gap," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1509, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    19. Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, 05.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    sequential search; voting;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3137. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak). General contact details of provider: http://www.iza.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.