On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts
What is the optimal size of expert committees? To address this question, I present a model of a committee of experts with career concerns. Each expert may observe an argument about the state of the world and is unsure about the argument s soundness. Experts may remain silent or compete for the opportunity to announce an argument. I show that experts become more reluctant to speak in larger committees. This effect is sufficiently strong to make small groups of experts optimal.
|Date of creation:||2012|
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