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The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills

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  • Ruth Ben-Yashar
  • Shmuel Nitzan

Abstract

The current note clarifies that Condorcet Jury Theorem cannot be generalized to the extended setting where individual decisional skills are not assumed to be exogenous parameters even when these skills are homogeneous. This is true when skills are determined endogenously either by a central planner or, in a decentralized strategic setting, by the decision makers themselves. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Suggested Citation

  • Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel Nitzan, 2001. "The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 243-249, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:243-249
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    2. Takuya Sekiguchi, 2016. "Optimal group composition for efficient division of labor," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 601-618.
    3. Bryan McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous Competence and a Limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Working Papers 16-12, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    4. Bryan C. McCannon, 2015. "Condorcet jury theorems," Chapters,in: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 9, pages 140-160 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    6. Volker Hahn, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-24, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    7. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0546-6 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Key words: Condorcet Jury Theorem; Investment in human capital; Endogenous skills; JEL classification: D71;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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