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Committee design with endogenous participation

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  • Hahn, Volker

Abstract

We analyze different committee designs in a model with the endogenous participation of experts who have private information about their own abilities. Each committee design involves a test of abilities whose accuracy influences experts' decisions to participate. We derive the following findings. First, higher wages continuously lower the quality of experts on the committee. Second, and as a consequence of this, optimal committees involve low wages. Third, an increase in transparency improves the quality of experts on the committee. Fourth, larger committees attract less able experts than smaller ones, unless the committee operates under full transparency.

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  • Hahn, Volker, 2017. "Committee design with endogenous participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 388-408.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:388-408
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.009
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    3. Daniel Gibbs, 2023. "Individual accountability, collective decision-making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 524-552, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committee decision-making; Adverse selection; Screening; Efficiency wages; Transparency; Career concerns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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