Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1986.
"Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 355-375, July.
- John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1985. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," UCLA Economics Working Papers 370, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lloyd Ulman, 1992. "Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 177-212, June.
- Hahn, Volker, 2017.
"Committee design with endogenous participation,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 388-408.
- Volker Hahn, 2013. "Committee Design with Endogenous Participation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-12, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Committee Design with Endogenous Participation," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145599, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Boldrin, Michael & Horvath, Michael, 1995.
"Labor Contracts and Business Cycles,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 972-1004, October.
- Michele Boldrin & Michael Horvath, 1994. "Labor Contracts and Business Cycles," Discussion Papers 1068, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Horvath, Michael & Boldrin, Michele, 1995. "Labor contracts and business cycles," UC3M Working papers. Economics 3905, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2017. "Contracting with endogenous entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 85-110.
- Ian M. McDonald, 1984. "Trying to Understand Stagflation," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 17(3), pages 32-56.
- Finkle, Aaron, 2005. "Relying on information acquired by a principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
- Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Manuelli, Rodolfo E, 1989.
"Labor Contracts in a Model of Imperfect Competition,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 358-363, May.
- V. V. Chari & Larry E. Jones & Rodolfo E. Manuelli, 1989. "Labor contracts in a model of imperfect competition," Staff Report 117, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Theories of Wage Rigidity," NBER Working Papers 1442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert H. Topel & Finis Welch, 1986. "Efficient Labor Contracts with Employment Risk," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 490-507, Winter.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
- John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984. "Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview," UCLA Economics Working Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Roger A. McCain, 1987. "Acceptable Contracts, Opportunism, and Rigid Hourly Wages," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 205-213, Jul-Sep.
- Ulman, Lloyd, 1992. "Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt8378t1rz, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ed Nosal & Richard Rogerson & Randall Wright, 1991. "A note on labor contracts with private information and household production," Staff Report 131, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1995. "Optimal social insurance, incentives, and transition," Working Papers 546, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:3203642. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Office for Scholarly Communication). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deharus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.