Contracting with Endogenous Entry
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2008.
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 649-669.
- Christopher Phelan & Marco Bassetto, 2004. "Tax Riots," 2004 Meeting Papers 375, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2006. "Tax riots," Working Paper Series WP-06-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, revised 2006.
- Christopher Phelan & Marco Bassetto, 2005. "Tax Riots," 2005 Meeting Papers 433, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
- Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
- Kahn, Charles M. & Green, Jerry, 1983. "Wage-Employment Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203642, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
- Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
- Paulo K. Monteiro & Flavio M. Menezes, 2000. "original papers : Auctions with endogenous participation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 71-89.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1999. "Vertical integration or separation of the sales function as implied by competitive forces," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 641-662, July.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo & Matteo Bassi, 2016.
"Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 520-556, September.
- Matteo Bassi & Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2013. "Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains," CSEF Working Papers 343, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- David Martimort, 1996.
"Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- Martimort, D., 1992. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery," Papers 92.278, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Martimort, David, 1994. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," IDEI Working Papers 43, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1996.
- Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1991. "Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 503-516, September.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
- Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
- Geroski, P. A., 1995. "What do we know about entry?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 421-440, December.
- Kessides, Ioannis N, 1986. "Advertising, Sunk Costs, and Barriers to Entry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(1), pages 84-95, February.
- Chakraborty, Indranil & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2001. "Auctions with endogenous entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 195-200, August.
- Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
More about this item
KeywordsEntry; Vertical Contracting; Asymmetric Information;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2016-02-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2016-02-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2016-02-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2016-02-23 (Regulation)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:426. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cssalit.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.