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Selling information to competitive firms

Author

Listed:
  • Jakub Kastl
  • Marco Pagnozzi
  • Salvatore Piccolo

Abstract

Internal agency conflicts distort firms' choices and reduce social welfare. To limit these distortions, principals dealing with privately informed agents often acquire information from specialized intermediaries, such as auditing and certification companies, that are able to ascertain, and credibly disclose, agents' private information. We study how the structures of both the information provision and the final good markets affect information accuracy. A monopolistic information provider may supply imprecise information to perfectly competitive firms, even if the precision of this information can be increased at no cost. This is due to a price effect of information: although more accurate information reduces agency costs and allows firms to increase production, it also results in a lower price in the final good market, which reduces principals' willingness to pay for information.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakub Kastl & Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2018. "Selling information to competitive firms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 254-282, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:49:y:2018:i:1:p:254-282
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12226
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    Cited by:

    1. Flavio Pino, 2022. "The microeconomics of data – a survey," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(3), pages 635-665, September.
    2. Jorge Padilla & Salvatore Piccolo & Helder Vasconcelos, 2020. "On the Private and Social Value of Consumer Data in Vertically-Integrated Platform Markets," CSEF Working Papers 583, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Shuaicheng Liu, 2024. "Privacy regulation in asymmetric environments," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 157-173, December.
    4. Jorge Padilla & Salvatore Piccolo & Helder Vasconcelos, 2022. "Business models, consumer data and privacy in platform markets," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(3), pages 599-634, September.
    5. Agarwal, Anish & Dahleh, Munther & Horel, Thibaut & Rui, Maryann, 2024. "Towards data auctions with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 323-356.
    6. Bonatti, Alessandro & Dahleh, Munther & Horel, Thibaut & Nouripour, Amir, 2024. "Selling information in competitive environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    7. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2019. "Markets for Information: An Introduction," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 85-107, August.
    8. Sarah Spiekermann & Hanna Krasnova & Oliver Hinz & Annika Baumann & Alexander Benlian & Henner Gimpel & Irina Heimbach & Antonia Köster & Alexander Maedche & Björn Niehaves & Marten Risius & Manuel Tr, 2022. "Values and Ethics in Information Systems," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 64(2), pages 247-264, April.
    9. Koski, Heli, 2018. "How Do Competition Policy and Data Brokers Shape Product Market Competition?," ETLA Working Papers 61, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    10. Shuaicheng Liu, 2023. "Location choice with asymmetric data in the Hotelling model," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 855-878, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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