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Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains

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  • Marco Pagnozzi
  • Salvatore Piccolo
  • Matteo Bassi

Abstract

We study a supply chain model where competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with privately informed and exclusive retailers. The number of brands in the market (determined by the manufacturers’ zero profit condition) depends on the level of asymmetric information within supply chains and on the types of contracts between manufacturers and retailers. With two-part tariffs, wholesale prices fully reflect retailers’ costs. With linear contracts, wholesale prices are constant and independent of retailers’ costs. The number of brands is lower (resp. higher) with asymmetric information than with complete information when contracts are linear (resp. with two-part tariffs). Moreover, the number of brands is always higher with linear contracts than with two-part tari¤s. We also analyze the effects of endogenous entry on welfare.
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  • Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo & Matteo Bassi, 2016. "Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 520-556, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:64:y:2016:i:3:p:520-556
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/joie.12107
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    Cited by:

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    4. Izak Atiyas & Toker Doganoglu & Firat Inceoglu, 2021. "Upstream Competition with Complex and Unobservable Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(3), pages 399-429, May.
    5. Leda Maria Bonazzi & Raffaele Fiocco & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Vertical Price Restraints and Free Entry Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 854-899, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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