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Auctions with endogenous entry

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  • Chakraborty, Indranil
  • Kosmopoulou, Georgia

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4379GRM-B/2/d67afb8288523b9b74856d25c6ae909e
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 72 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 195-200

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:72:y:2001:i:2:p:195-200
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
  2. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
  4. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June.
  5. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987. "On Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(6), pages 763-770, June.
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Cited by:

  1. Di Gaetano, Luigi, 2011. "A model of descending auction with hidden starting price and endogenous price decrease," MPRA Paper 35773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Vagstad, Steinar, 2007. "Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 597-614, June.
  3. Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles, 2003. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms wth Costly Information Acquisition," IDEI Working Papers 205, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0518, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  5. Damian Damianov, 2012. "Seller competition by mechanism design," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 105-137, September.
  6. Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
  7. Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009. "Auctions with costly information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January.
  8. Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2004. "Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1420, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Hsueh, Shao-Chieh & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Nonratifiability of the Cartel Mechanism in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction with Participation Costs," MPRA Paper 41202, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2010.
  10. Tian, Guoqiang & Xiao, Mingjun, 2009. "Vickrey Auctions with Sequential and Costly Participation," MPRA Paper 41203, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Ronald M Harstad, 2011. "Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0816, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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