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Relying on information acquired by a principal

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  • Finkle, Aaron

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  • Finkle, Aaron, 2005. "Relying on information acquired by a principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:23:y:2005:i:3-4:p:263-278
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
    2. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 174-193, November.
    3. Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2000. "Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 667-689, May.
    4. Kahn, Charles M. & Green, Jerry, 1983. "Wage-Employment Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203642, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
    6. Lafontaine, Francine & Slade, Margaret E, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
    7. repec:bla:joares:v:31:y:1993:i:1:p:1-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
    9. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135.
    10. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
    2. Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Capital-labor distortions in project finance," Working Papers 15-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    3. Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high-powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316.
    4. Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
    5. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December.
    6. repec:kap:jeczfn:v:124:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-017-0587-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.

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