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Informed principal and information gathering agent

  • Dongsoo Shin

    ()

  • Sungho Yun

    ()

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-008-0049-4
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Article provided by Springer & Society for Economic Design in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 229-244

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:4:p:229-244
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: https://sites.google.com/site/societyforeconomicdesign/

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Cremer, J. & Khalil, F. & Rochet, J.-C., 1997. "Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9708, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Michael H. Riordan, 1984. "Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 83-93.
  3. Ashish Arora & Andrea Fosfuri & Alfonso Gambardella, 2004. "Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262511819, December.
  4. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
  6. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Organizational Diseconomies of Scale," Working Papers 728, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  7. Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991. "Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract," Working Papers 91-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  8. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
  9. Bennett Harrison & Maryellen R. Kelley, 1993. "Outsourcing and the Search for `Flexibility'," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 7(2), pages 213-235, June.
  10. Finkle, Aaron, 2005. "Relying on information acquired by a principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
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