Is Transparency to No Avail? Committee Decision-Making, Pre-Meetings, and Credible Deals
Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision-making that explains the public.s demand for transparency, and committee members. aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Outcomes of pre-meetings, deals, are less determined, more anarchic, than those of formal meetings, but within bounds. We characterize deals that are self-enforcing in the formal meeting.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy|
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "A Decision-Theoretic Basis for Choice Shifts in Groups," CEPR Discussion Papers 4423, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007.
"The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 311-315, May.
- Motty Perry & Larry Samuelson, 1994.
"Open- versus Closed-Door Negotiations,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 348-359, Summer.
- Ellen E. Meade & David Stasavage, 2004.
"Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0608, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, 04.
- Prat, Andrea, 2003.
"The Wrong Kind of Transparency,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 439, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andrea Prat, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2006.
"Consensus building: How to persuade a group,"
PSE Working Papers
- Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2008.
"Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6677, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2012. "Information acquisition and transparency in committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 427-453, May.
- John Fingleton, 2005. "Career Concerns of Bargainers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 179-204, April.
- Birger Wernerfelt, 2007. "Delegation, Committees, and Managers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 35-51, 03.
- Stephen Morris, 2001.
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
- Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September.
- Gilat Levy, 2007.
"Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation, and voting rules,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
3697, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
- Gilat Levy, 2005. "Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation and voting rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 543, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Joseph Stiglitz, 1998. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
- Job Swank & Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2008. "How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the FOMC," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 478-486, 04-05.
- Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-97, June.
- Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2004. "Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16, pages 321-345, November.
- Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
- Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2008/18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Banks)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.