Public versus Secret Voting in Committees
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References listed on IDEAS
- Gilat Levy, 2007.
"Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
- Levy, Gilat, 2005. "Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation and voting rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 543, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Levy, Gilat, 2007. "Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation, and voting rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3697, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Coughlan, Peter J., 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 375-393, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019.
"Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
- Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2018. "Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 13280, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2019. "Mind-changes at the FOMC," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Alessandro RIBONI & Francisco RUGE-MURCIA, 2018. "Deliberation in Committees : Theory and Evidence from the FOMC," Cahiers de recherche 01-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
More about this item
KeywordsCommittees; Voting; Career Concern; Transparency;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2017-01-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2017-01-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-01-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2017-01-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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