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Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition

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  • Swank, Otto H.
  • Visser, Bauke

Abstract

We study committees that acquire information, deliberate, and vote. A member cares about state-dependent decision payoffs and his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved. In such environments, members’ internal reputations are based on deliberation patterns, while members’ external reputations are based on the observed group decision. We find that either form of reputation concerns creates strategic complementarity among members’ effort levels. Internal reputations create stronger incentives to become informed than external reputations. Their strength grows in committee size; external reputations create no incentives in large committees. Finally, reputation concerns may relax participation constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:221:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000579
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104875
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committee decision making; Reputation concerns; Information acquisition; Strategic complements; Peers; Markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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